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 According to orthodox representationalism, perceptual states have constitutive veridicality or 
accuracy conditions. In defense of this view, several philosophers, but most notably Burge 
(2010), employ a realist strategy that turns on the purported explanatory ineliminability of 
representational posits in perceptual science. I argue that Burge’s version of the realist strategy 









According to orthodox representationalism, perceptual states, and not just post-perceptual 
states (e.g. judgement, belief), are representational in the sense of having constitutive truth, 
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veridicality, or accuracy conditions.  In defense of orthodox representationalism, a number of 
philosophers appeal to the broadly Marrian (computational) explanatory framework for visual 
perception (e.g.  Burge 2010, Rescorla 2015, Hill 2014, Schellenberg 2018, Matthen 2005). 
However, the grounds for this appeal are nowhere more clearly articulated than in Burge 
(2010). According to Burge, realism about some of the framework’s representational posits is 
justified because those posits are explanatorily ineliminable, i.e. eliminating posits bearing the 
constitutive features of representation would result in explanatory loss.   
Burge’s argument has generated many responses, but many of these responses, 
sympathetic and critical alike, neglect the heart of his argument.    
Rescorla (2015), for instance, attempts to buttress Burge by appealing to the 
representational posits of specifically Bayesian perceptual psychology, the explanatory success 
of this paradigm, and its mathematical rigor. But Rescorla’s arguments do nothing to buttress a 
key feature of Burge’s grounds for realism, namely, the empirical grounds for treating perceptual 
systems as having a representational function.  In fact, Burge denies that perceptual systems 
make “inferences,” as a Bayesian model would have it, in any non-metaphorical sense, and he’s 
clear that the mere fact that a science uses the term “representation,” “veridicality,” etc., doesn’t 
show that the science is committed to a robust notion of representation. ( 27) Indeed, Burge 
thinks that much of what sensory and perceptual scientists call “representations” are merely 
“deflationary” representations, i.e. the products of systems that are responsible for “information 
registration,” where this information may play a functional (typically biological) role, but where 
we can account for the activity of these systems and the states they produce without invoking 
veridicality or accuracy conditions.1 To wit, deflationary sensory representations are sensory 
                                               
1 See also Orlandi (2014).  
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states which sciences may refer to as representations, but for which accuracy conditions are 
explanatorily eliminable. According to Burge, only where a sensory system has a 
representational function are accuracy conditions explanatorily ineliminable. So only where 
ineliminable representational posits also ineliminably function representationally does science 
provide grounds for realism about (robust) perceptual representation.  
As I’ll explain in (§1), the mere success of the computational (Marrian, Bayesian) 
framework is not sufficient evidence of ineliminable representational function because that 
framework presupposes that perception functions to veridically represent, and there are 
competing frameworks that can also boast of success that claim that perception instead has an 
action-guiding function. I’ll also explain why we cannot, and why Burge does not, conclude a 
priori that perception’s action-guiding function entails its having the function to veridically 
represent.  
According to Burge, representational function is only ineliminable for explanations of 
sensory systems that exhibit the perceptual constancies. Many philosophers have discussed ( e.g. 
Vincente 2012, Aguilera 2016) and some have also criticized (e.g. Ganson, Bronner, and Kerr 
2014; Olin 2016) Burge’s conception of the perceptual constancies in connection with his 
defense of representationalism without recognizing the connection he draws between the 
constancies and what he calls “objectifying capacities,” and between objectifying capacities and 
representational function. As I’ll explain in (§2), the constancies enter Burge’s picture as 
empirical evidence of the existence of sensory systems that function to (descriptively, 
veridically) represent, for Burge thinks that the constancies constitute objectifying capacities.  
 In (§3) I’ll argue that the constancies probably aren’t objectifying capacities, and ipso 
facto probably aren’t empirical evidence of sensory systems that function to veridically 
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represent.  However, in (§4) I’ll suggest that Burge’s realist strategy may support a form of 
representationalism that exchanges constitutive veridicality conditions for constitutive 
appropriateness conditions.   
§1. 
As Frisby and Stone note, computational theories of vision begin with the question “what 
is vision for?” and the answer to this question “has shifted over time, reflecting the changing 
emphasis within the research field of vision” (2010, 545)  According to David Marr, when 
perceptual processing runs correctly,  it “delivers a true description of what is there” (1982, 30) 
and “the true heart of visual perception is the inference from the structure of an image about the 
structure of the real world outside” (68). Similarly, Knill et. al assert that: “Visual perception … 
involves the evolution of an organism’s visual system to match the structure of the world and the 
coding scheme provided by nature” (1996, 6). However, over the last two decades, the Marrian 
approach has been challenged by a different paradigm in computer vision: Active Vision, so 
called “because its key idea is to build seeing systems geared to specific sorts of visually guided 
actions”(Frisby and Stone 2010, 545). 
The Active approach to computer vision has developed systems for, among other things, 
automatic surveillance. A computer visual system might be designed to guide a video camera rig 
to track a potential suspect with “the visual processing built to do that having no idea of what the 
tracked object is.” This serves as an example of a vision module designed to perform a certain 
action (camera control) “without doing anything else (such as recognizing the tracked object)” 
(Frisby and Stone, 545). Hence, it appears that in perceptual action-control and perceptual 
tracking, it is possible to bypass intermediate descriptive representations (e.g. object 
identification). Active Vision may provide a better model of biological vision than traditional 
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models. At the very least, the ideas of Active Vision have guided a vigorous program of research 
in biological vision (Findlay and Gilchrist 2003).   
So where Marr answers the question “what is vision for” with “to know what is where by 
looking,” the active vision paradigm answers: “for guiding actions.” Of course, these answers are 
not obviously in conflict: perception might function to veridically represent in order to achieve 
its action-guiding function (see e.g. Palmer 1999, 6; see also Marr 1982, 340). But as Burge 
knows, this isn’t a given.   
 Burge cites Kathleen Akins’s (1996) empirically driven arguments against the 
"traditional view of the senses" as a major impetus to his (2010, xviii). On the traditional view,  
"sensory systems must be veridical in some sense of the word," that is, the senses ought to report 
the "what, when, and where" of the world's events” and  "provide an accurate account of just 
how things are: the brain must be able to tell, from the signals it receives, how things stand in the 
world." Akins’s case study is thermoreception. If thermoreception has the function of providing 
accurate information about the world, then, ceteris paribus, the sensory response that we think 
tracks temperature ought to be produced (except for in cases of malfunction, which should 
presumably be rare) only in the presence of temperature stimuli. And if the temperature rises, the 
response should reflect this, i.e. if the temperature rises only slightly, the sensory system should 
ipso facto register only a slight increase. It should not systematically exaggerate or embellish on 
the information it’s receiving from the world. Rather, it should strive to be objectively accurate.  
As it turns out, however, this isn’t the way human thermoreception works at all. Rather 
than striving to accurately report on the world, Akins argues that most sensory systems are 
concerned with how the organism is being affected. She dubs such systems “narcissistic.” And 
when it comes to navigating the world successfully, narcissism probably has a selective 
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advantage over “veridical” measuring systems, for their "narcissism" makes them fit to serve the 
demands of what Akins calls the "sensory-motor project": “the pre-ontological narcissistic 
encoding of the information required to act and get around in the world.” The upshot of Akins’s 
argument is that there's a gap between the demands of this project and those of what she terms 
the "ontological project": “to conceive of types and tokens, places, and objects as existing at all 
given our sensory access to the world” (369). 
The gap between these projects is mirrored in Burge's distinction between biological 
functions, which are essentially practical, and representational functions, which, he thinks, have 
essentially to do with veridicality. Burge’s distinction rests on the dissociability of these 
functions, i.e. their conditions of success. A system can fail representationally by being quite 
inaccurate with respect to the environment, and that inaccuracy itself may serve biological 
success. On the flip-side, a system might succeed representationally by being extremely accurate, 
and this could be a biological shortcoming of the system. So, there's a gap and potentially a 
tension between biological success and representational success.   
This gap underwrites Burge’s key objection to teleosemantic accounts of representation, 
as these attempt to ground representation in biological function.2 Burge claims that there’s “a 
root mismatch between representational error and error of biological function” (2010, 301). The 
reason is that, as Stitch (1990, 62) observed, “natural selection doesn’t care about truth; it cares 
about reproductive success,” or, as Burge puts it “Evolution does not care about veridicality. It 
does not select for veridicality per se” (303). Indeed, though Burge makes no mention of such 
work, several perceptual psychologists have recently employed evolutionary game theory to 
investigate the likelihood of evolving objectifying capacities-- i.e. of descriptive function being 
                                               
2  This issue is omitted in discussions of Burge’s criticisms of bio-functionalism. See e.g. 
Vincente (2012), Aguilera (2013).  
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selected as a means to successfully guiding action. Their overwhelming verdict: it’s extremely 
unlikely (e.g. Hoffman 2009, Jager 2007, O’Connonr 2014). 
According to Burge, veridicality conditions for a putative content analyzed in terms of 
biological function simpliciter are explanatorily eliminable;  the explanatory work they do is 
“redundant” (2010,  9). Veridicality conditions merely provide  an intentional gloss on the 
explanatorily essential posits:  natural signs (information carriers) which are not, in themselves, 
representational, and biological functions which do not, essentially, have anything to do with  
veridicality, and thus cannot, on their own, confer descriptive norms and ipso facto explanatorily 
essential veridicality conditions. Appealing to information and biological function alone secures 
only deflationary representation, for nothing about biology guarantees that accuracy should be 
the goal of an evolved system.  
Why then should we think that perceptual systems function to (descriptively) represent? 
Burge’s answer: the constancies. 3   
§2 
 Burge’s (2010) aims to provide a de-intellectualized account of the conditions that must 
be met for an individual to achieve objective representation as of particulars in the environment. 
Burge rejects what he calls “Compensatory Individual Representationalism” (CIR), according to 
which perception delivers something short of objective representation, i.e., subjective 
representation; in order to achieve objective representation, the individual must supplement what 
perception gives her. Against CIR, Burge argues that there is no sensory representation short of 
objective representation. Genuine representation requires explanatorily ineliminable veridicality 
                                               
3 Gilchrest (2006, 126) notes that “machine vision’s emphasis on veridicality resonated with the 
traditional themes of constancy in psychology, bringing this issue back to the foreground.”  
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conditions, and the only sensory states for which veridicality conditions are ineliminable are 
those that issue from sensory systems that we must understand as having descriptive function. 
Which systems are those? Perceptual systems. In contrast to mere sensory registration (mere 
sensation), perception “requires perceptual constancies" (399). 
Key for Burge is the relationship between the constancies and objectification. According 
to Burge, the constancies constitute the "central instances of perceptual objectification" (397). 
Since genuine representation begins with objectification, objective representation isn’t the result 
of  sensory representations that are supplemented by the individual. For sensory outputs that are 
not objective must be nonrepresentational, and hence mere sensations.  
Objectification is realized via the constancy mechanisms that perform transformations on 
proximal stimulation that, purely perceptually (non-conceptually, i.e. independent of judgement), 
achieve the stable perception of actual macro-level physical properties of distal stimuli. Burge 
understands these mechanisms as capacities for “separating out” information about the creature 
and how it’s being affected from information about the world, and, critically, as capacities for 
getting the objective world right: they determine, via internalized physical constraints, what 
physical categories (attributes) to posit upon the receipt of various patterns of subjective 
proximal simulation. They thereby track objective properties of the distal cause. Burge thinks 
that perceptual science has discovered these objectifying capacities and that the representational 
function of perceptual sensory systems are manifest in scientific descriptions of constancy 
mechanisms, hence his assertion (e.g. xi-xii)  that  perceptual representations are natural kinds.  
 But the case for considering the perceptual constancies “objectifying capacities” is weak. 
§3. 
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Hatfield (2009) critiques the view that perceptual systems aim at full constancy, i.e. to 
represent an object with the properties that it has--its veridical or objective size, shape, position, 
and color. One of his targets is the physicalist construal which is “most clearly present in 
formulations of perceptual constancies as seeking to solve an inverse problem: that of inferring 
back from the proximal stimulus to its physical cause” where the aim of constancy is to “produce 
a mental representation of the physical properties of surfaces” (185). In other words, Hatfield 
targets Burge’s construal of the constancies.   
Perceptual reports differ systematically depending on the way the experimenter explains 
the perceptual task to subjects, and/or on what questions they are asked. The earlier literature 
didn’t explicitly control for such factors, resulting in ambiguity in the data. V.R. Carlson’s 
(1977) review of the literature corrected for this by distinguishing “projective” (projective 
shape), “apparent” (how the shape looks, sans cognitive correction), and “objective” (the real 
shape they believe the object to have) instructions.  
The results were surprising: projective instructions yield close to projective results, 
apparent instructions yield underconstancy or perfect constancy, and objective instructions yield 
constancy or overconstancy (size is overestimated;  shape is overcorrected). The results were 
also robust: investigators from Robert Thouless (1931, 1932) onwards (Shape: Epistein et al. 
1977; Size: Epistein 1963; Granrud 2004, 79; Wagner 2006, 130) have observed underconstancy 
in the perception of size and shape: reported phenomenal size is near to but less than real size, 
and reported phenomenal shape is nearer to real shape than projected shape-- even in full cue 
conditions.  
Hatfield suggests that part of the reason underconstancy seems surprising is that scientific 
and philosophical investigators have failed to appreciate the phenomenological implications of 
Copyright The Philosophy of Science Association 2019. Preprint (not copyedited or formatted). 
Please use DOI when citing or quoting. DOI: 10.1086/705525
This content downloaded from 155.198.030.043 on August 04, 2019 08:57:35 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
10 
full constancy. For instance, “…with full constancy, objects of the same size should appear with 
exactly the same size despite being at different distances” and “...we should see a hallway with 
no phenomenal convergence whatsoever” (188-9). Of course, this isn’t the way the world 
spatially appears. Rather, Hatfield hypothesizes that the entire visual space contracts with 
distance, yielding diminished phenomenal size with increasing distance even under full cue 
conditions (ibid, 198) This contracted space also affects phenomenally presented shape (ibid, 
203). 
 Hatfield’s hypothesis was initially studied by Franz Hillebrand (1902). Hillebrand found 
that in order to make black cords on a white table top appear parallel, and to adjust a suspended 
curtain of threads to produce phenomenally parallel walls, subjects set the chords and curtain 
threads to diverge as they ran near to far. Walter Blumenfeld (1913) subsequently conducted an 
experiment in which subjects had to adjust individual lights in an otherwise dark alley so that 
they formed either phenomenally parallel lines from far to near or equidistant horizontal intervals 
at various distances. In reduced-cue conditions, Blumenfeld found that the parallel appearing 
lights diverged even more than had Hillebrand’s cords. From their findings, both Hillebrand and 
Blumenfeld inferred phenomenal contraction.  
Neither Hillebrand nor Blumenfeld took their findings to support a non-Euclidean 
geometry for visual space. But in the 1940s, Rudolf K. Luneburg reinterpreted their results in 
accordance with non-Euclidean geometry, proposing that visual space is a hyperbolic space of 
constant negative curvature. This was in part because Luneburg (1947, 39) held that only if 
visual space is of constant curvature can it meet the conditions usually associated with physical 
possibility: that objects can freely rotate and move in space without altering their shapes, 
permitting true size constancy. Tarow Indow’s (1962, 1982) investigations contributed additional 
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data consistent with Luneburg’s proposed non-Euclidean geometry for visual space. However, 
while Indow (1991) agreed with Luneburg about the desirability of constant curvature, he 
concluded from further data that planes perpendicular to the line of sight are non-Euclidean in 
structure, so that any curvature of visual space would be in the depth dimension to the viewer 
(Hatfield 2009, p 198-99). 
Similarly, Mark Wagner’s (2006, ch. 7) extensive empirical investigations of the global 
structure of visual space lead him to conclude that it’s a general fact about human visual 
experience that it contracts with respect to visual space in the depth dimension, i.e. in the 
direction running away from the observer. Wagner cast further doubt on Luneburg's suggestion 
that visual space meets the axioms that define a constant physical space, including free mobility 
of objects without distortion by reviewing a literature showing deviations from Euclidean 
structure (e.g., Koenderink et al. 2000) while producing no single constant metric, and showing 
dynamic effects on judgment of size and orientation that depend on the presence or absence of 
stimuli besides the target object (Thorndyke 1981; Schoumans et al. 2002; Indow 1991, 450). 
Wagner concluded that there’s no single metric for visual space: “no single geometry can fully 
encompass human visual experience” (2006, 223; see also Suppes 1977). Rather, multiple 
metrics may arise depending on the visual task, and variable metrics may apply to a single 
phenomenal experience.  
Likewise, because Hatfield’s proposed contracted space does not exhibit free mobility, it 
does not meet the usual conditions on a physically possible space. Hatfield consequently denies 
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the physicalist assumption that perception aims to phenomenally present physical sizes and 
shapes “as they are.”4 
Why then do perceiver’s reports often respect full constancy under objective instructions? 
Hatfield proposes that contracted spatial experience enables subjects to recognize or judge the 
real, objective physical shapes and sizes with some accuracy, and that the products of such 
judgements or acts of recognition are phenomenologically present (the phenomenological 
presence of the conceptual) (ibid, 190). Critically, Hatfield holds that our ability to respond to 
true, objective, or physical sizes and shapes arises from judgmental or recognitional abilities that 
employ concepts and reasoning. Though phenomenally integrated into occurrent experience, 
these abilities are psychologically distinct from visual appearances themselves (187). 
 Hatfield’s explanation takes a cue from Granrud (2004). Granrud argues that apparent 
size diminishes with distance (beyond 3 meters) for both adults and children, but between the 
ages of 5 and 10, children learn to reason about the effects of distance on apparent size. Though 
they show slight underconstancy at near distances (5 or 6.1 meters) and exhibit underconstancy 
for far distances when asked to report on “apparent size,” when asked to report “objective size”, 
they exhibit full or overconstancy. But notably, children exhibit no difference between apparent 
and objective instructions when they did not show that they could reason about the effects of 
distance. To explain this data, Granrud proposes that “adults and children have the same 
perceptual experience” (78) of apparent size diminishing wish distance, while “far-distance size 
constancy results from a cognitive judgement and is not a feature of perception” (89). The view 
that the constancies require cognitive contributions is consistent with a number of empirical 
                                               
4 Both Hatfield and Wagner Wagner (2006, 177) suggest that successful action guidance is 
compatible with contracted visual space. Hatfield even suggests that contracted visual space may 
be selectively preferred for successful spatial behavior.  
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studies on human perceptual constancies that assume cognitive contributions. In other words, 
there’s strong reason to think that spatial constancies qua objectifying are not capacities of 
perception proper, and there’s even more reason to be skeptical in the case of color constancies 
(see e.g. Chirimuuta 2008, 2015; Hatfield 2009, 2003).  
Explanations of the constancies in simpler creatures that are unlikely to rely on 
judgement, on the other hand, don’t give them the appearance of objectifying capacities.  Hutto 
and Myin (2012) make this case on the basis of Neander’s (2006) detailed reportage on the state 
of the art science concerning the brain and behavior of anurans (frogs and toads), noting that 
Burge “definitively places frogs (as well as fish and octopi) on the list of perceivers. All these 
creatures unquestionably make the cut as full-blooded (if cold-blooded) perceivers because they 
can perceive basic constancies (Burge 2010, 420)” (119). Anurans also exhibit what Burge 
considers the most reliable indicator that any individual is an objectifying perceiver: the capacity 
to localize—i.e. determine the direction and distance—of a “distal source of stimuli without 
serial sampling” (Burge 2010, 427). Frogs localize both by orienting toward or away from 
interesting stimuli, and by targeting and snapping at prey.  
Neander concludes that the working assumptions of the relevant sciences do not include a 
commitment to anuran perceptual representation in any obvious or robust way.  She reports that 
neuroethologists “rarely if ever utter sentences beginning with ‘the content of a +T5(2) is . . .’ or 
‘+T5(2)s mean . . .’, or ‘+T5(2)s [activated neuron of a certain relevant sort] represent. . . .” 
Indeed, Neander states that she must “concede to those who dislike talk of content in the case of 
such simple systems that there is little explicit talk of error concerning what is represented” (ibid, 
183). Following Barlow (1953), Chirimuuta (2015, 110) draws a similar conclusion about the 
nature of the frog’s “bug detector.”  
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Treating the constancies not as objectifying capacities but as capacities for robust 
responsiveness appears to be in line with actual scientific practice, while Burge’s interpretation 
appears unparsimonious.  As Hutto and Myin put the point: “The perceptual sciences, it seems, 
would not collapse if it turned out that true perceivers fall into the class of aspectual respondents 
but not that of attributive claimants… perception doesn’t depend on, or entail, the existence of 
attributive states of mind” (121). 
One might object: But we can’t understand the organization and activity of sensory 
regions in an animal's brain without considering the parts of the environment with which its 
activity covaries. No doubt this covariation is a critical part of the way the brain executes its 
perceptual functions. But this doesn’t entail robust representation: information is not robust 
representation (Ramsey 2007, ch. 4), and causal covariation is ubiquitous and non-normative. 
Indeed, while teleosemanticists consider causal covariation “information” and take it to provide 
at least some critical part of representation, information, covariation, or indication is 
representation only when it has the right function.  If Burge is right that this must be the function 
to veridically represent, and if I’m right that scientific explanation does not entitle us to attribute 
this function to perceptual systems,  Burge’s realist strategy for defending representationalism is 
a no-go.  
But this may be too quick.  
§4. 
According to Neander, while neuroethologists rarely invoke standards of veridicality, 
they do invoke standards of “appropriateness ” (184).  Hutto and Myin rightly claim that this 
isn’t grounds for orthodox representationalism to celebrate. But what about a different sort of 
representationalism?  
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Elsewhere, I develop and defend an account of what I call “instructive 
representationalism” (Springle, Unpublished Manuscript). According to instructive 
representationalism, perceptual experience is constituted by the application of instructive 
categories to or on situations, where the application of an instructive category constitutes an 
instructive representation. Instructive categories constitute a kind of mode of presentation that is 
distinct from the more familiar descriptive mode of presentation. The latter are third-personal 
modes of presentation that present things (including actions) as having some property 
(qualitative, quantitative, causal, metaphysical, or normative), and the descriptive representations 
their applications constitute are evaluable as true/false (or veridical/falsidical; 
accurate/inaccurate).  
Instructive categories, in contrast, are first-personal practical modes of presentation that 
instructively stand-for tokens of types of actions perceivers might produce in response to  
situations so as to promote their flourishing, i.e. to meet their needs. Actions are presented as 
means, but not as being means, i.e. not as objects (events) independent of the perceiver and 
characterized by a practical nature. Instructive categories relate perceivers directly to actions that 
are in their power to produce; perceptual experiences present perceivers with their own relational 
potentialities-- their own possible performances in relation to environmental particulars. 
Instructive representations function not to describe the world but to position perceivers to take 
the appropriate means with respect to the world, depending on what their actual needs are. 
Instructions are successful not by virtue of the actions they instruct being manifested, but by 
virtue of being appropriate with respect to the situations on which they are occasioned. An 
instruction is appropriate iff were the perceiver to execute the instructed action with respect to 
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the situation, doing so would satisfy the need with which the action-type, qua means, is 
constitutively connected.   
Instructive representationalism is a version of what Mazviita Chirimuuta (2015) calls 
“Perceptual Pragmatism”: it’s an alternative to philosophical views that assume that perception 
succeeds when it accurately describes the world according to which perception functions to “help 
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